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Abstract
We nest conjectural parameters into a standard oligopoly model. The conjectural
parameters are modeled as functions of multimarket contact. Using data from the US
airline industry, we 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coordination; ii) cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of
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rms behave as Bertrand-Nash competitors leads to biased estimates of marginal
costs.
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1 Introduction
Detecting tacit collusion is a central theme of research in empirical industrial organization
(Jaquemin and Slade [1989], Porter [2005], Harrington [2008]). In most instances, tacit
collusion leads oligopolistic rms to monopolize a market, leading to reduced and ine¢ cient
equilibrium output, higher prices, and lower consumer welfare.1 Not surprisingly, then,
detecting collusion is a fundamental objective of antitrust agencies in both Europe and the
United States. In the US, collusion is prohibited under the Sherman Act.2
Identifying collusive behavior poses di¢ cult econometric challenges. If we see all rms
charging the same price, is it because they are colluding and charging the monopoly price,
or are they competing aggressively against each other while facing similar costs? If one rm
raises its prices and its competitors respond by raising their prices as well, can we conclude
that rms in this market are colluding? Or should we be worried about conscious parallelism,
whereby it may be rational to follow the anticompetitive lead of ones rival if the rm believes
that the rival has better information about market conditions (Porter and Zona [2008])?3
Previous work has identied collusive behavior by using variation in costs (Rosse [1970],
Panzar and Rosse [1987], Baker and Bresnahan [1988]),4 rotations of demand (Bresnahan
[1982], Lau [1982]), taxes (Ashenfelter and Sullivan [1987]), conduct regimes (Porter [1983]),
and product entry and exit (Bresnahan [1987], Nevo [2001]).5 Here, we propose a di¤erent
1A notable exception, Fershtman and Pakes [2000] show that collusive pricing can lead to increased entry
and welfare-improving product variety.
2Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, any cartel or cartel-like behavior is per seillegal. Other practices,
where, for example, rms might appear to be tacitly colluding, are examined under a rule of reason analysis.
Probably the most famous instance when the antitrust agencies were able to detect collusion is the lysine
price-xing conspiracy. As reported by White [2001], in October 1996 the Archer Daniels Midland Company
(ADM) pleaded guilty to criminal price xing with respect to sales of lysine and agreed to pay a $70 million
ne.
3More generally, the identication problem that we face when trying to detect collusion is conceptually the
same as the one that Manski [1993] called the reectionproblem. Firms might be charging the same prices
because of exogenous (contextual) e¤ects, for example they o¤er similar products; or because of correlated
e¤ects, for example they face similar (unobservable to the econometrician) marginal costs; or because they
do actually collude (endogenous e¤ects).
4See Weyl [2009] for a discussion on the identication of conjectural parameters using variation in costs.
See Salvo [2010] for a recent work that uses conjectural parameters to identify market power under the threat
of entry.
5There is also an important literature on detecting collusion in auctions, which presents its own econo-
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identication strategy.
We identify collusive behavior by using variation in multimarket contact across airline
markets. Multimarket contact is dened as the number of markets in which rms encounter
each other.6 In Bernheim and Whinstons [1990] words, multimarket contact serves to pool
the incentive constraints from all the markets served by the two rms. That is, the more
extensive is the overlap in the markets that the two rms serve, the larger are the benets
of collusion and the costs from deviating from a collusive agreement.7
We quantify multimarket contact using the measure rst introduced by Evans and Kes-
sides [1994] (EK, from here on). Multimarket contact between any pair of airline carriers is
equal to the total number of markets that two airlines serve concomitantly. For example, if
American and Delta serve 200 markets in common, then this variable is equal to 200 for the
American-Delta pair.
We consider a model of the airline industry where the strategic interaction among rms
is measured by conjectural parameters that are functions of multimarket contact. Our
modeling strategy implements an idea rst proposed by Nevo [1998], who o¤ers a constructive
synthesis of the two main methodological ways to identify collusion.8 The rst line of research
(for example, Panzar and Rosse [1987], Bresnahan [1982], Ashenfelter and Sullivan [1987],
and Porter [1983]) identies collusive behavior by estimating conjectural parameters, which
revealed whether rms competed on prices, competed on quantities, or colluded.9 The second
line of research, which started with Bresnahan [1987], estimates di¤erent behavioral models
and compares how these models t the observed data (Gasmi, La¤ont, and Vuong [1992],
Nevo [2001]). We take some ingredients from the rst line of research (the conjectural
parameters) and nest them into the modeling framework proposed by the second line of
metric challenges. See Hendricks and Porter [1989] for more on that literature.
6The denition of multi-market contact is attributed to Corwin Edwards; see Bernheim and Whinston
[1990].
7If, for example, two rms interact in many markets, then they know that if they deviate from collusive
behavior in one market, they will be punished by the other rms in all the markets where they interact.
8This type of approach that looks for identifying potential facilitators of collusion in the industry has also
been recently advocated by Berry and Haile [2010].
9See Bresnahan [1987] for a superb review of the early empirical work in industrial organization.
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research.
The main identication concern is whether multimarket contact is exogenous.10 In their
theoretical analysis, Bernheim and Whinston [1990] think of multimarket contact as an
external factor. However, one might reasonably think that there is some source of unob-
servable heterogeneity that determines both prices and multimarket contact. For example,
in the airline industry the multimarket contact is a variable constructed using information
on the markets served by an airline, and an airline might self-select into markets where it has
a competitive advantage (Ciliberto and Tamer [2010]). We instrument for the multimarket
contact variables using a unique and original dataset on the number of gates controlled by
each airline at many airports in the US. The number of gates is naturally correlated with
the number of markets served by an airline out of an airport, but is not directly correlated
with the pricing decisions.11
In our reduced-form analysis, we generally conrm the ndings of EK. We nd that
multimarket contact is associated with higher equilibrium fares using both a xed-e¤ects
and instrumental-variables approach.
In the structural analysis, we directly link multimarket contact to collusion. First, we
nd that carriers with little multimarket contact (e.g. JetBlue and Frontier served 2 markets
concurrently in the second quarter of 2007) do not cooperate in setting fares. Carriers with
a signicant amount of multimarket contact (e.g. Delta and US Air served 1150 markets
concurrently in the second quarter of 2007) can sustain near-perfect cooperation in setting
fares. Thus, for very high levels of multimarket contact, where rms are already perfectly
coordinating on prices, there is very little impact from an increase in multimarket contact.
However, for low or moderate levels of contact, there is a signicant increase in fares. Sec-
ond, we nd that the standard assumption that rms behave as Bertrand-Nash competitors
10This is a well-recognized problem in the empirical literature on multimarket contact. Waldfogel and
Wulf [2006] use the enactment of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 to identify the e¤ect of multi-market
contact.
11While an airline can enter and exit markets quite easily and quickly, it is much more di¢ cult to gain
access to an airport. The crucial observation here is that the control of gates is associated with sunk entry
costs that a¤ect the entry decision but cannot respond contemporaneously to demand or cost shocks as
prices do.
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leads to marginal cost estimates 30 percent higher than when we use a more exible behav-
ioral model that allows rms to behave di¤erently depending on the extent of multimarket
contact. Finally, we show that cross-price elasticities play an important role in determining
the impact of multimarket contact on equilibrium fares. If two goods are close substitutes,
then cooperation in setting fares will result in a larger change from the competitive outcome
than in cases where two goods are not such close substitutes.
Our paper is related to previous research that studies the impact of multimarket contact on
the strategic decisions of rms (Jans and Rosenbaum [1997], Singal [1996], Parker and Roller
[1997], Fernandez and Marin [1998], Busse [2000], Waldfogel and Wulf [2006], Bilotkach
[2010], and Miller [2010]). However, our work di¤ers from these earlier works in three
dimensions. First, we treat multimarket contact as endogenous and use an instrumental-
variable approach to control for its endogeneity. Previous solutions to the endogeneity of
multimarket contact included xed-e¤ects approaches (e.g. EK) and exploiting regulatory
changes to identify a causal relationship (Waldfogel and Wulf [2006] and Parker and Roller
[1997]). Second, we propose a structural model nested in the mainstream empirical indus-
trial organization literature to directly link multimarket contact to the degree of coordination
in rmsdecisions. The extant literature has only been able to link multimarket contact to
market outcomes, such as prices, providing less information about the degree of coordination
that di¤erent levels of multimarket contact can support. Finally, we clearly discuss the me-
chanics by which multimarket contact matters through its links with cross-price elasticities.
This is economically important to understand because it allows one to identify markets or
industries where collusive behavior will result in signicantly higher prices and lower welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. The data are described in Section 2. Section 3 presents
the reduced-form analysis and results. Our structural econometric approach is discussed in
Section 4 and the results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and discusses possible extensions
of our research.
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2 Data
We use data from three main sources.12 First, we use data from the Airline Origin and
Destination Survey (DB1B) database, a 10% sample of all domestic itineraries which provides
information on the fare paid, connections made in route to the passengers nal destination,
and information on the ticketing and operating carriers. Second, we use data from the
BEA on the population of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). Finally, we use data
from a survey that we conducted jointly with the ACI-NA, an airport-trade organization, on
carrier-specic access to boarding gates at a large number of airports in 2007.13
2.1 Market Denition
Like EK, we dene a market as a unidirectional trip between two airports in a particular
quarter regardless of the number of connections a passenger made in route to his or her
nal destination. We consider markets in which at least 250 passengers were transported
in at least one quarter from 2006 to 2008.14 Finally, we restrict our sample to airports for
which we have information on access to boarding gates. Our nal sample contains 268,119
observations at the product-carrier-market level.
In what follows, markets are indexed by m = 1; :::;M . There are 6; 366 markets. Year-
quarter combinations are denoted by t = 1; :::T . We use data from 2006 to 2008, so
T = 12. The subindex j = 1; :::; Jmt denotes a product j in market m at time t. A
product is dened by the carrier (e.g. American) and the type of service, either nonstop
or connecting. The total number of carriers in the dataset is 17 and includes American
(AA), Alaska (AS), JetBlue (B6), Continental (CO), Delta (DL), Frontier (F9), ATA (FL),
Allegiant (G4), Spirit (NK), Northwest (NW), Sun Country (SY), AirTran (TZ), USA3000
(U5), United (UA), USAir (US), Southwest (WN), Midwest (YX). A product is then denoted
by a combination jmt, which indicates that product j (e.g. nonstop service by American)
12Data on the consumer price index were accessed through the Bureau of Labor Statisticswebsite at
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables
13A copy of the survey is available from the authors upon request.
14We drop any markets where fewer than 100 passengers were served in any quarter from 2006 to 2008.
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transports its passengers in market m (e.g. Chicago OHare to Fort Lauderdale) at time t
(e.g. the second quarter of 2007).
2.2 Multimarket Contact
We follow EK in measuring multimarket contact, here denoted by mmctkh, where k and h
are two distinct carriers and t is a time period. For a particular carrier and one of its com-
petitors, this variable is calculated as the total number of markets that the two airlines serve
concomitantly. For example, in the rst quarter of 2007, American and Delta concomitantly
served 855 markets; therefore mmctkh equals 855. For each quarter we construct a matrix
of these pair-specic variables. Table 1 shows the matrix, mmct, for the 17 carriers in our
sample in the rst quarter of 2007.
For each quarter, we then use the mmct matrix to calculate the market-specic average
of multimarket contact,15
AvgContactmt =
1
Fmt(Fmt 1)
2
 FX
k=1
FX
h=k+1
1 [k and h active]mt mmctkh;
where 1[k and h active]mt is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if carriers k and h are
both in market m at time t, Fmt is the number of incumbent rms in market m at time t,
and F is the total number of airlines (17). Thus, AvgContactmt is equal to the average of
the variable mmctkh across the rms actively serving market m at time t. This variable is
summarized in Table 2.
15Notice that this measure is not rm specic. In work that is not shown here we have run our reduced-form
regressions considering the following average:
AvgContactjmt =
1
(Fmt   1)
FX
k 6=h
1 [k and h active]mt mmctkh:
The results are nearly identical.
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2.3 Fares
We calculate average fares at the product-carrier-market level, where a product is either
nonstop or connecting service.16 Table 2 summarizes the average fare, Farejmt.17 The
average of Farejmt of a one-way ticket across all carriers and markets from 2006 to 2008 is
around $223.18
To control for price di¤erences in one-way and round-trip tickets we include the variable
Roundtripjmt, which measures the fraction of round-trip tickets over the total number of
tickets sold by a carrier in a market.
2.4 Limited Access to Airport Facilities
Airlines require enplaning/deplaning gates to provide service at an airport. Ciliberto and
Williams [2010] show that limited access to gates is an important determinant of equilibrium
fares and explains approximately 50% of the hub premium, rst documented by Borenstein
[1989]. We use information on gates as the source of exogenous variation that identies the
e¤ect of multimarket contact on the ability of rms to coordinate their prices.
Gates are typically allocated to carriers through long-term leasing agreements (often more
than 10 years) which give a carrier either exclusive or preferential rights to use the gate,
while a small fraction of an airports gates are usually reserved for common use. Given the
importance of access to airport facilities in determining equilibrium fares and the inability
of a carrier to contemporaneously respond to demand or cost shocks by altering the number
of gates it leases at an airport, the allocation of gates among carriers provides a robust set
of instruments. In our empirical analysis, we use data on the total number of gates at
the airport, the number leased to each carrier on a preferential or exclusive basis, and the
16Like EK and consistent with our market denition above, we treat roundtrip tickets as two one-way
tickets and divide the fare by two. We also drop exceedingly high and low fares (greater than $2500 and less
than $25) which are likely the result of key-punch errors. Fares are then deated using the consumer price
index to 2009 dollars. Like Berry [1992], we drop carriers which do not represent a competitive presence in
each market by transporting fewer than 100 passengers in a quarter.
17All results and conclusions are robust to using the median fare instead of the average.
18This average, across carriers and markets, is not weighted by the number of passengers traveling under
each fare.
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number reserved for common use by the airport authority.
We collected these detailed data on carrier-specic leasing agreements from airports as
part of a survey conducted jointly with the ACI-NA. For the 17 carriers in our sample, we
construct the mean of the percentage of gates leased on an exclusive or preferential basis by
each carrier at the two market endpoints. For each carrier (e.g. AA_avgm for American),
this variable is summarized in Table 2. The signicant amount of variation across markets
in the fraction of gates leased by each carrier provides a great source of identifying variation.
We also construct a variable, Common_Avgm, as the mean fraction of gates reserved by the
airport authority for common-use.
2.5 Control Variables
Carriers can o¤er both nonstop and connecting service.19 Thus, for each product o¤ered
by a carrier in a market, we generate a dummy variable, Nonstopjmt, that is equal to 1 if
the service o¤ered by a carrier is nonstop. Table 2 shows that approximately 17% of the
observations in our dataset correspond to nonstop services o¤ered by a carrier.
A second source of di¤erentiation among carriers is related to the size of the carriers
network at an airport (Brueckner, Dyer, and Spiller [1992], Lederman [2007, 2008]). In
particular, carriers serving a larger number of destinations out of an airport have more at-
tractive frequent yer programs and other services at the airport (number of ticket counters,
customer service desks, lounges, etc.). To capture this idea, we compute the percentage
of all markets served out of an airport that are served by an airline and call this variable
NetworkSizejmt.
Particular aspects of a market also a¤ect the demand for air travel. One important
element of demand is the number of consumers in a market. Like Berry, Carnall, and
Spiller [2006] (BCS, from here on) and Berry and Jia [2010], we dene the size of a market,
MktSizemt, as the geometric mean of the population at the market endpoints. Another
19Even if carriers may o¤erboth types of services, one of the two types is either exceedingly inconvenient
or prohibitively costly to both the carrier and consumer. Thus, we usually see either nonstop or connecting
service but not both in the DB1B sample.
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important determinant of consumerstravel decisions is the nonstop distance between the
endpoints of a market, Distancem. One may expect on shorter markets, travel as a whole
is more attractive, while in very long markets any form of travel is less attractive due to the
time spent reaching ones destination. Also, the availability and attractiveness of substitutes
to air-travel varies signicantly depending on the distance between the market endpoints.
Since the relationship between Distancem and the demand for air-travel may have some
nonlinearities due to these countervailing e¤ects, we include both Distancem and its square
directly in consumers utility function in our structural analysis. We also construct a
variable, Extramilesjmt, to measure the indirectness of a carriers service. More precisely,
Extramilesjmt is the average distance own by consumers choosing a product relative to the
nonstop distance in the market.
Finally, we construct an indicator,Hub jm, which is equal to one if one of the two endpoints
of market m is a hub airport of carrier j.20 The variable Hubjm captures whether ying on
the hub airline is more attractive than ying on any other airlines. It also captures potential
cost advantages.
3 Reduced-Form Analysis
In this section, we rst replicate the work of EK and then motivate the structural model by
pointing out the limitations of a reduced-form analysis of this type.
3.1 Replicating Evans and Kessides [1994]
EK test the hypothesis that multimarket contact facilitates collusion by running the following
regression:
ln(pjmt) = AvgContactmt  AvgContactmt + ControlsjmtControls + "jmt (1)
20The hub airports are Chicago OHare (American and United), Dallas/Fort Worth (American), Denver
(United), Phoenix (USAir), Philadelphia (USAir), Charlotte (USAir), Minneapolis (Northwest, then Delta),
Detroit (Northwest, then Delta), Atlanta (Delta), Cincinnati (Delta), Newark (Continental), Houston (Con-
tinental).
10
where j indexes products, m markets, and t time. The dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of the average price for product j. The main variable of interest is AvgContactmt,
whose coe¢ cient AvgContactmt is expected to be positive. In addition to the controls discussed
below, all specications also include carrier and year-quarter xed e¤ects. In four of the six
specications we also include market xed e¤ects. We present the results of these regressions
in Table 3.
Column 1 of Table 3 replicates the main market-xed-e¤ects regression in EK. We
include data for only the 1,000 largest routes, with the ranking constructed after aggre-
gating the number of passengers in each market over all periods. The variables mmctkh
and AvgContactmt are constructed with the data from the small sample. The mean of
AvgContactmt is equal to 0:21 in this small sample. This number is very similar to 0:18,
the mean value of the AvgContactmt in EK. Following EK, we include a measure of market
share,MktSharejmt, the number of passengers transported by a carrier in a market over the
total number of passengers transported in that market, as well as the Herndhal-Hirschman
Index of passengers, HHImt, a measure of market concentration.
We nd that the coe¢ cient of multimarket contact is equal to 0:246. This number should
be compared to 0:398, the number reported in Column 3 of Table III in EK. To understand
whether the di¤erence between these two numbers is economically meaningful, we can multi-
ply each number by 0:128, which is the change in AvgContactmt that EK nd when moving
from the route in their sample with the twenty-fth percentile in contact to a route with
the seventy-fth percentile. Using our estimates, we nd that such a change in multimarket
contact corresponds to a change of 3 percent in fares, compared to 5 percent in EK. The
results for the control variables, when precisely estimated, are also comparable with those
in EK.
Column 2 of Table 3 presents another regression in the spirit of EK. We again include
data for only the 1,000 largest routes. The only di¤erence between Columns 1 and 2
concerns the control variables. Column 2 excludes HHImt and MktSharejmt, which are
endogenous, and includes a dummy variable, Hubjm, which is exogenous. The result for
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the variable of interest, AvgContactmt, is nearly identical. The coe¢ cient of AvgContactmt
is equal to 0:291, which implies that a 0:128 change in AvgContactmt would result in an
increase in prices of 4 percent.
Column 3 of Table 3 considers the full sample of markets. The variables mmctkl and
AvgContactmt are constructed using the full sample of markets. The striking result now is
that AvgContactmt has a negative e¤ect on prices. A crucial limitation of AvgContactmt
is that it is not well dened for monopoly markets, for which the denominator 1
Fmt(Fmt 1) is
zero. In these cases, we follow EK and set the variable AvgContactmt equal to zero. The
problem with this solution is that, ceteris paribus, prices are higher in monopoly markets
than in oligopoly markets. Yet, we expect prices to increase with multimarket contact.
Figure 1 clearly illustrates the signicance of this problem. The gure reports two lines,
the predicted values of the regression of prices on multimarket contact when we include
monopolies and when we dont. We also include the median spline of prices as a function
of multimarket contact. There is clearly a discontinuity in the relationship between average
multimarket contact and prices when multimarket contact is equal to zero. Prices are high
when multimarket contact is equal to zero (monopoly markets), but immediately drop to
their lowest point when multimarket contact is just above zero and then increase monoton-
ically with multimarket contact. As Column 3 demonstrates, if there are many monopoly
markets, this discontinuity signicantly alters the reduced-form regression results. As we
discuss below, the structural analysis does not rely on the average measure, AvgContactmt,
but on the pair-specic measures, mmctkh. Consequently, the structural analysis does not
encounter this discontinuity problem. It also has the advantage of using information from
the distribution of multimarket contact within a market, rather than just the mean.
In Column 4 we run the same regressions using only non-monopoly markets. The coe¢ -
cient of AvgContactmt is now positive and statistically signicant. Its e¤ect is smaller than
the one we estimated in Column 3. Here, the change of 0:128 in AvgContactmt implies
an increase in prices of less than 1 percent against the change of 4 percent we estimated in
Column 2.
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Overall, the e¤ects of multimarket contact on prices range between 1 and 5 percent when
we include market xed e¤ects which uses only within-market variation in multimarket
contact and prices to identify the causal e¤ect of the rst on the second. This presents
a problem, since variation within a market in multimarket contact may be driven by the
same factors that drive within-market variation in prices. For example, a negative shock
(unobserved to the econometrician) to demand may lead rms to exit the market, potentially
resulting in an increase (or decrease depending on who exits) in multimarket contact and
an increase in fares. However, it would be incorrect to regard this correlation as evidence
of a causal relationship between multimarket contact and fares. In these situations, as
Griliches and Mairesse [1995] suggest, xed-e¤ects will perform poorly and the researcher
should search for an instrument-variables solution. We follow this suggestion.
To construct instrumental variables, we use the carrier-specic gate data. Our main
identifying assumption is that the control of gates is a determinant of prices through its
e¤ect on the entry decisions of rms. That is, gates determine which rms serve a market,
which in itself determines the value of AvgContactmt. The long-term nature of gate leasing
agreements ensures that the allocation of gates among carriers cannot respond to transient
shocks driving within-market variation in prices. The instruments we use include the average
fraction of gates leased by each carrier at the market endpoints and the average fraction of
gates reserved for common use at the market endpoints. Also, for each carrier and market
we generate three instruments to capture the level of potential competition a carrier faces in
a market from legacy and low-cost carriers as well as Southwest: the sum over carrier-type
(legacy, Lcc, Southwest) of the average fraction of gates leased by each carrier at the market
endpoints.
Column 5 of Table 3 presents the results from the instrumental variable regressions with
market-specic random e¤ects. We consider the full sample of markets, including monopoly
markets. We estimate the coe¢ cient of AvgContactmt equal to 0:520. This means that the
change of 0:128 in AvgContactmt would imply, approximately, an increase in prices of 6:5
percent. This e¤ect is similar to those from the estimates in Columns 1 and 2. Column 6
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is the same specication as Column 5 but does not include monopoly markets. The results
are similar to those inColumn 5. The marginal e¤ect is now estimated equal to 8:5 percent.
Overall, our results are largely consistent with those of EK. In the section to follow, we
explore what can be learned from a more structural approach.
3.2 Motivating a Structural Analysis
There are three clear reasons for exploring a more structural approach.
First, the reduced-form analysis shows that an increase in multimarket contact leads to
higher prices. However, we cannot determine the exact degree by which multimarket contact
leads to a more collusive behavior, hence to higher prices. In particular, we can only recover
the relationship between fares and multimarket contact, not collusion and multimarket con-
tact.
Second, the reduced-form analysis only examines the relationship between average mul-
timarket contact and equilibrium fares. A more structural approach allows one to take into
account the full distribution of each carriers contact with every other carrier in the market.
To see why looking at a distribution is important, consider two markets that are identical
except for the degree of contact between the incumbent carriers. Suppose at time t, the
multimarket contact matrix for the two markets is given by
mmct =
0@  :75 :75:75  :75
:75 :75 
1A ; mmct =
0@  1 10:25  :25
1 1 
1A :
In both markets AvgContactmt is equal to 0:75. However, suppose that 750 markets are
enough to support full cooperation between carriers in setting fares, while 250 markets is
not. In the rst market, there would be full cooperation in setting fares. In the second
market, there would be full cooperation between the rst carrier and the other two carriers.
However, the level of multimarket contact between carriers two and three would result in less
cooperation in setting fares. This simple example demonstrates that there is not necessarily
a one-to-one mapping between AvgContactmt and equilibrium fares as the reduced-form
analysis assumes.
14
Finally, the structural analysis deals with the sample selection issue related to monopoly
markets in a natural way. Monopoly markets are not used to identify the e¤ect of multimarket
contact, since there is only one rm in those markets. However, monopoly markets are used
to identify all the other parameters of the model. Thus, our structural model of demand and
pricing utilizes information from the full sample to identify demand and marginal cost while
also providing insight into the relationship between multimarket contact and collusion.
4 Structural Analysis
In this section, we describe our structural approach for identifying the relationship between
multimarket contact and collusion.
4.1 Demand
Our basic demand model is most similar to BCS and Berry and Jia [2010]. We allow for 2
consumer types, r = f1; 2g. For product j in market t (for simplicity, we abstract from the
market, m, subscript), the utility of consumer i of type r, is given by
urijt = xjtr + pjtr + jt + it() + "ijt
where xjt is a vector of product characteristics, pjt is the price, (r; r) are the taste pa-
rameters for a consumer of type r, and jt are product characteristics unobserved to the
econometrician. The term, it() + "ijt, is the error structure required to generate nested
logit choice probabilities for each consumer type. The parameter,  2 [0; 1], governs sub-
stitution patterns between the two nests, airline travel and the outside good (not traveling
or another form of transportation).21 The mean utility of the outside good is normalized to
zero since only di¤erences in utility, not levels, are identied.
The proportion of consumers of type r choosing to purchase a product from the air travel
nest in market t is then
Drt
1 +Drt
(2)
21See Goldberg (1995) and Verboven (1996) for models of demand with multiple nests.
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where
Drt =
JtX
k=1
e(xjtr+pjtr+jt)=.
The probability of a consumer of type r choosing product j, conditional on purchasing a
product from the air travel nest, is
e(xjtr+pjtr+jt)=
Drt
(3)
Together, Equations 2 and 3 imply that product js market share, after aggregating across
consumer types, is
sjt(xt;pt; t; d) =
2X
r=1
r
e(xjtr+pjtr+jt)=
Drt
Drt
1 +Drt
(4)
where r is the proportion of consumers of type r and d is the collection of demand pa-
rameters to be estimated. To control for persistent variation in consumerstastes across
carriers and time, we add carrier and year-quarter xed e¤ects (djt) such that
jt = jt   djt 
Following Berry [1994] and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes [1995], we exploit a set of moment
conditions formed by interacting the structural error term, , with a set of instruments
to recover estimates of d. We use a variation of the Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes [1995]
contraction mapping, due to BCS, to invert Equation 4 and solve for the value of the un-
observables that matches the models predicted shares to observed market shares for each
product, conditional on d = f; ; ; ;  g. Observed market shares are calculated as
the number of passengers transported by a carrier in a market divided by MktSizemt. To
estimate these parameters, we form the sample counterpart of the moment condition
gd = E

jt(d) jzjt )

= 0
where zt is a vector of instruments. We treat price as an endogenous regressor and use the
average percentage of gates leased by each of the carriers (not just those present in market
j at time t) at the markets endpoints to generate a set of instruments.
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4.2 The Bertrand-Nash Pricing Game
We maintain that airline rms compete on prices and o¤er di¤erentiated products.22 We
start by assuming that observed equilibrium prices are generated from play of a Bertrand-
Nash pricing game (Bresnahan [1987]). This assumption generates the following supply
relationship for any product j belonging to the set of products, l = 1; :::; F kt , produced by
rm k in a market at time t,
sjt +
X
l2Fkt
(plt  mclt) @slt
@pjt
= 0:
where mclt is the marginal cost of product l.
For each market, this set of Jt equations implies price-cost margins for each product.
Using matrix notation, this set of rst-order conditions for market t can be rewritten as
st  
t(pt mct) = 0 (5)
where each element of 
 can be decomposed into the product of two components, 
jl =
jljl. The rst component is the own or cross-price derivatives of demand, jl = @slt=@pjt,
while the second component is an indicator of product ownership. More precisely, if products
j and l belong to the same rm, then jl equals 1 while jl equals 0 otherwise. With the
exception of Nevo [2001], the literature has assumed that  is a diagonal matrix (block-
diagonal in the case of multi-product rms), strictly ruling out any coordination between
rms in setting prices. In the next section, Section 4.3, we discuss how our model departs
from the literature regarding the assumptions made on rm behavior.
4.3 Multimarket Contact and Conjectural Parameters
As pointed out by Nevo [1998, 2001], the standard assumptions on the structure of  rules
out a continuum of pricing outcomes between the competitive Bertrand-Nash ( is diagonal
22In assuming that airlines compete in prices and o¤er di¤erentiated products, we follow a well-established
literature on airline competition; see Reiss and Spiller [1989], Berry [1990], BCS, Peters [2006], Berry and
Jia [2010]).
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or block-diagonal in the case of multi-product rms) and the fully-collusive outcome (
is a matrix of ones). In the case of homogenous products, Bresnahan [1982] and Lau
[1982] provide intuitive and technical, respectively, discussions of how "rotations of demand"
can be used to distinguish between di¤erent models of oligopolistic competition or identify
"conjectural" or "conduct" parameters. Recent work, see Berry and Haile [2010], formally
demonstrates how to extend the intuition of Bresnahan [1981, 1982] to di¤erentiated product
markets. Berry and Haile [2010] show that changes in the "market environment" can be
used to distinguish between competing models, including variation in the number, product
characteristics, and costs of competitors.
In the context of the airline industry, one such shifter of the "market environment" is the
degree of multimarket contact between carriers. In particular, we expect higher levels of
multimarket contact between competitors to facilitate collusion. To capture this idea, we
depart from di¤erentiated literature and dene jl as a function of multimarket contact. In
particular, if product j is owned by carrier k and product l is owned by carrier h, then jl
equals f(mmctkh). This function, determining the amount of coordination between carriers
k and h in setting fares, is bound between zero and one and dependent on the level of
multimarket contact between the two carriers, mmctkh, the fk; hg element of the contact
matrix. Thus, the conjectural parameters tell us whether price-setting rms compete or
collude. If the conjectural parameters are estimated to be equal to zero, we can conclude
that rms do not cooperate in setting fares. If the conjectural parameters are estimated to
be equal to 1, we can conclude that rms collude.23
The interpretation of these "conjectural" or "conduct" parameters is most easily seen by
examining the rst-order conditions in the case with two rms. In this case, the rst-order
23This type of modeling is admittedly less ambitious than the one proposed by the earlier work on the
estimation of conjectural parameters (e.g. Brander and Zhang [1990, 1993]). In earlier work, conjectural
parameters informed the researcher both on the choice variable of the rms (whether rms compete on prices
or quantities) and whether the rms collude or compete. Our approach, while less ambitious, is still very
e¤ective and simple to generalize to any industry where there is a market-specic exogenous variable that
shifts the incentive of rms to collude.
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conditions are (market and time subscripts are omitted for simplicity)
s1
s2

+
"
@s1
@p1
f (mmc12)  @s2@p1
f (mmc21)  @s1@p2 @s2@p2
#
p1  mc1
p2  mc2

= 0:
The rst-order condition of rm 1 is then
s1 +
@s1
@p1
(p1  mc1)| {z }
Bertrand FOC
+ f (mmc12)  @s2
@p1
(p2  mc2)| {z }
Cooperative E¤ect
= 0: (6)
The additional cooperative term is what di¤erentiates our model and makes clear how mul-
timarket contact impacts equilibrium pricing behavior.
The impact of this additional term depends on two factors. First, the size of f (mmc12)
determines the degree to which rms cooperate in setting fares. In particular, values of
f (mmc12) ranging from zero to one result in equilibrium pricing behavior ranging from the
competitive Bertrand-Nash outcome to a fully collusive outcome, respectively. Second,
the degree to which cooperation increases prices depends on the cross-price derivatives of
demand, @s2
@p1
and @s1
@p2
. This is intuitive, if the products that rms o¤er are close substitutes
(@s2
@p1
and @s1
@p2
are relatively large), then cooperation will result in fares that are signicantly
higher than the competitive Bertrand-Nash outcome.
Our goal is to utilize these rst-order conditions to estimate both the conjectural para-
meters and the marginal cost functions of each rm. The set of rst-order conditions for
each market, Equation 5, can be inverted as
pt  
 1t st  mct = 0 (7)
where we specify the marginal cost for product j in market t as
mcjt = wjt + djt + !jt
The wjt vector includes Distance and its square, Extramiles and its square, and djt, a set
of carrier and year-quarter dummies. The error term, !jt, is the portion of marginal cost
unobserved to the econometrician.
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We specify the conjectural parameters as
f(mmckh) =
exp(1 + 2mmckh)
1 + exp(1 + 2mmckh)
which restricts f(mmckh) between zero and one.24
We then use Equation 7 to form the sample counterpart of the moment condition,
gs = E [!jt(d; s) jzjt )] = 0;
where s are the conjectural and marginal cost parameters and zjt are the vector of instru-
ments discussed in Section 2.4. Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes [1995], we estimate
 = fd; sg by minimizing
Q() = G()0W 1G()
where G() is the stacked set of moments, (gd; gs), and W is a consistent estimate of the
e¢ cient weighting matrix.25
5 Multimarket Contact and Collusion
The structural estimates are reported in Table 4 which is organized into panels. The
top panel presents the results for the demand estimation. The middle panel presents the
estimates of the cost parameters. The next panel presents the results for the conjectural
parameters, 1 and 2. The bottom panel describes marginal costs and elasticities of demand.
5.1 Bertrand-Nash Competition
Column 1 of Table 4 presents the estimates from the model when we assume rms price as
Bertrand-Nash competitors.26 The demand estimates in the top panel are largely consistent
with the previous studies of the industry (BCS [2006] and Berry and Jia [2010]).
24We nd nearly identical results for an alternative specication for the conjectural parameters,
f(mmctkh) = max

0;min

1; 1 + 2mmc
t
kh
	
:
Given the similarity in the results, for conciseness, we only report the results for the rst specication.
25Due to the highly nonlinear nature of the objective function and potential for local minima, we use a
stochastic optimization algorithm (simulated annealing) to nd a global minimum.
26We also estimated a nested-logit model of demand with one consumer type. The qualitative implications
are very similar, suggesting that the specic model of demand is not driving the results.
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First, as one would expect, consumers dislike higher fares, ceteris paribus. We nd the
coe¢ cients of price to be equal to  1:32 for the rst type and equal to  0:126 for the second
type. Not only are these two coe¢ cient estimates signicantly di¤erent statistically, but their
magnitudes are also quite di¤erent. We can think of the rst type as the tourist type, who
is very sensitive to prices, while the second type can be thought of as the business-traveler
type, who is much less sensitive to prices. The mean own-price elasticity across all markets
and products for the tourist type is equal to  4:31 while only  0:42 for the business-traveler
type. The mean own-price elasticity across all markets, products, and types is  3:042, a
number consistent with previous work.27
Out of all travelers, we nd two-thirds are of the rst, more elastic type. This is consistent
with the notion that a large fraction of airline passengers travel for tourism, and only one-
third of them are business passengers. This segmentation of the market in business and
vacation travelers is consistent with information that we collected from the American Travel
Survey, a survey conducted in 1995 by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) to
obtain information about the long-distance travel of persons living in the United States.
After some elaboration of the survey, we nd that the average fraction of business travelers
is approximately 40 percent.
Next, we can look at the decision to y rather than use other means of transportation
or simply not traveling at all. This decision is captured by the coe¢ cient estimates of the
type-specic constants and by the nesting parameter . The nesting parameter is greater
than 0:5 in every specication, suggesting much of the substitution by consumers between
products occurs within the air-travel nest, rather than to the outside option. This means
that passengers are more likely to substitute between carriers when prices change rather
than deciding not to y at all. We nd that the estimated constant for the tourist type is
27Our demand is estimated to be slightly more elastic than the estimates of Berry and Jia [2010]. This
di¤erence is likely driven by how products are dened. Berry and Jia [2010] identify each unique fare
observed in the data as a di¤erent product. Since we do not know whether the unique fares observed in
the data are in fact a result of variation in unobserved product characteristics or part of an intertemporal
pricing strategy of the rm, we chose to aggregate all fares for a carrier in a quarter into one of two groups,
nonstop and connecting service.
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equal to  5:692 and for the business-traveler type is equal to  7:626. This means that the
business types are less likely to travel, but when traveling they are less price sensitive.
The results for the other variables are as expected. Both tourist and business travelers
prefer nonstop ights and dislike longer connections. Travelers prefer ying with carriers
o¤ering a larger network out of the originating airport, which is consistent with previous
work; see BCS and Berry and Jia [2010]. The positive coe¢ cient on Distance and negative
coe¢ cient on Distance2 show that consumers nd air travel more attractive in markets with
longer nonstop distances; however, this e¤ect is diminishing as the nonstop distance becomes
larger and the outside option becomes more attractive.
On the cost side, we nd that the marginal cost of serving a passenger is increasing,
although at a decreasing rate, in the nonstop distance between the market endpoints. We
also nd that the marginal cost of connecting service is more expensive than nonstop service.
The mean of marginal cost across all markets is $111.28
5.2 Collusion
Next, we estimate the model under the assumption that rms fully cooperate in setting fares.
In his study of the 1955 price war in the American automobile industry, Bresnahan [1987]
shows that one can get dramatically di¤erent coe¢ cient estimates under di¤erent behavioral
assumptions. In this section we set out to test how sensitive the parameter estimates are to
the assumed behavioral model.
Column 2 of Table 4 shows the results under the assumption that rms fully cooperate
in setting fares. First, we nd that the price coe¢ cients are now equal to  1:674 for the
tourist traveler against the value of  1:32 that we had estimated in Column 1. We nd
that the estimated coe¢ cient of price for the business traveler is now equal to  0:223, twice
as large as in Column 1. This large di¤erences in the estimated coe¢ cients lead to
signicantly di¤erent estimates of the marginal cost, whose average is now estimated to be
28This is at the high end of the range of estimates in Berry and Jia (2010), who dene costs for roundtrip
service while we dene trips for one-way service. Thus, when comparing the estimates, one should normalize
the estimates of Berry and Jia (2010) by dividing by two.
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equal to 53:7 dollars, approximately 50% less than the estimates in Column 1.
The coe¢ cient estimate of 1 is also very di¤erent in Columns 1 and 2. The fraction of
tourist travelers is now down to 40:1 percent from 67:5 percent. This is clearly inconsistent
with the information we collected from the American Travel Survey.
The estimates of the cost coe¢ cients are also quite di¤erent in Columns 1 and 2. The
constant term is almost half as big (0:502 against 0:869). Moreover, the cost is now increasing
at a slower pace in distance. Finally, we nd the marginal cost of connecting service is now
less expensive than nonstop service at all distances. This is not a particularly surprising
result since longer connections through major hubs often involve the use of larger planes that
have a lower cost per passenger.
5.3 A Model with Conjectural Parameters
Column 3 of Table 4 presents the estimates of the model where we allow the degree of
price coordination to depend on the level of multimarket contact between each carrier in a
market. That is, we now look at a model that allows the rms to behave di¤erently with
di¤erent competitors. That is, rm A might be colluding with rm B but not with a rm
C.
We start again from the demand estimates. We immediately observe that the coe¢ cient
estimates in Column 3 are much closer to those in Column 1 (Bertrand-Nash behavior)
than to those in Column 2 (collusive behavior). For example, the price coe¢ cients for the
rst type of consumer, the tourist type, are equal to  1:32 in Column 1 and  1:189 in
Column 3, but up to  1:674 in Column 2. The price coe¢ cient for the business travelers
is equal to  0:117 in Column 3 and equal to  0:126 in Column 1. It was estimated equal
to  0:223 in Column 2.
Now consider the fraction of vacation travelers. This fraction is equal to 68:7 percent in
Column 3 and to 67:5 in Column 1, but it is equal to 40:1 percent in Column 2.
The cost estimates in Column 3 are between those in Column 2 and Column 1. The
mean of marginal cost is now equal to $77, compared to the estimate of $111 in Column
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1 and $53:7 in Column 3. This suggests that strict assumptions regarding rm behavior,
rms behaving as Bertrand-Nash competitors or as a fully-collusive cartel, leads to biased
estimates of marginal cost. The intuition for marginal costs now being lower than in
Column 1 is because the presence of the conjectural parameters, 1 and 2; allows for an
alternative to high marginal costs as an explanation for the high fares we observe in some
markets.
Consider now the estimates for 1 and 2 which shift the conjectural parameters. We
estimate 1 equal to  3:145 and 2 equal to 6:006. Figure 2 plots the conjectural pa-
rameters. From Figure 2 it is clear that carriers with little multimarket contact do not
cooperate in setting fares. Carriers with a signicant amount of multimarket contact can
sustain near-perfect cooperation in setting fares.
Table 5 provides a one-to-one mapping from multimarket contact matrix in Table 1 to
the level of cooperation carriers can sustain in setting fares. In particular, Table 5 presents
f(mmc) evaluated at each element of Table 1. As an example, consider the interaction
between American and Delta. Table 1 shows that in the rst quarter of 1997 the two rms
overlapped in 855 markets. In Table 5, we nd that the conjectural parameter is equal
to 0:880, which is essentially saying that American and Delta collude in fares in markets
that they concomitantly serve. Consider, instead, the interaction between American and
JetBlue. From Table 1 we know that they overlap in 84 markets. Table 5 shows that the
conjectural parameter is equal to 0:067, which implies that they do not cooperate in setting
fares.
The results suggest that legacy carriers cooperate with one another to a large degree in
setting fares. However, there is very little cooperation between most low-cost carriers and
legacy carriers. This nding is largely consistent with that of Ciliberto and Tamer [2009],
who show that there is heterogeneity in the competitive e¤ects of airline rms and that an
additional low-cost competitor has a much more signicant impact on the level of competition
in a market than an additional legacy competitor. There is one notable exception. In
recent years, AirTran has rapidly expanded its network out of Deltas Atlanta-Hartseld
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hub. Our results suggest these two carriers can now maintain some level (f(mmc) = 0:398)
of cooperation in setting fares. Remarkably, Delta and AirTran are currently the target of a
civil class-action lawsuit alleging cooperation in introducing and maintaining additional fees
on checked bags.29
The structural model predicts that di¤erent levels of multimarket contact between carriers
imply di¤erent levels of cooperation in setting fares. However, coordination in setting fares
does not necessarily translate to fares signicantly di¤erent from those that would be realized
from a competitive Bertrand-Nash pricing game. To examine the impact of multimarket
contact on fares, we perform an exercise similar to the one used in the reduced-form analysis.
In particular, we increase the average multimarket contact in a market by 0:128, increasing
each carriers contact with every other carrier by 0:128, and look at the resulting percentage
change in fares. These results are presented in the top half of Figure 3. The bottom half
of Figure 3 plots the mean change in fares across all markets for increases in multimarket
contact of 0:128, 0:256, and 0:384, respectively.
In both parts of Figure 3, the initial level of average multimarket contact in the market
is on the x-axis, and the resulting percentage change in the average fare in the market on
the y-axis. The results in the top half of Figure 3 are exactly as one would expect given the
shape of Figure 2. For very high levels of multimarket contact in which rms are already
perfectly coordinating on prices, there is very little impact from an increase in multimarket
contact. However, for low or moderate levels of contact, there is a signicant increase in
fares, ranging from 1% to 6%. For these moderate levels of contact, there is also a great deal
of dispersion in the change in fares resulting from the increase in multimarket contact. This
dispersion can largely be explained by examining Equation 6, which shows the important
role that cross-price elasticities play in determining the size of the change in fares. The
results in the bottom half of Figure 3 are also intuitive; larger increases in multimarket
contact result in larger increases in fares, except at very high levels of contact where rms
are already perfectly coordinating.
29The case is Avery v. Delta Air Lines Inc., AirTran Holdings Inc. 09cv1391, U.S. District Court, Northern
District of Georgia (Atlanta).
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As mentioned above, the impact on fares of a marginal increase in multimarket contact
depends on the cross-price elasticity of demand. To see why, recall that the cooperative
e¤ect is measured by f (mmc12) @s2@p1 (p2  mc2). Figure 4 plots the mean percentage change
in fares resulting from the same 0:128 increase in average multimarket contact for di¤erent
cross-price elasticities. More precisely, we use the average cross-price elasticity across all
products in the market. The gure shows that in markets where cross-price elasticities are
high, the increase in fares resulting from an increase in multimarket contact is larger. For
moderate levels of multimarket contact, the mean percentage change in fares increases from
2% to 5% depending on the cross-price elasticities in the market. For very high levels of
initial multimarket contact, regardless of the cross-price elasticity, there is almost no change
in fares since rms are already fully colluding.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we build on Nevo [1998] to develop a new methodological approach to identify
collusive behavior in the US airline industry. In particular, we nest conjectural parameters
into a standard oligopoly model where rms compete on prices and o¤er di¤erentiated prod-
ucts. We identify the conjectural parameters using variation in multimarket contact across
local airline markets. We nd that carriers with little multimarket contact (e.g. Frontier
and Delta) do not cooperate in setting fares, while carriers with a signicant amount of
multimarket contact (e.g. US Air and Delta) can sustain near-perfect cooperation in setting
fares. We also nd that cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact
of multimarket contact on collusive behavior and equilibrium fares.
Our methodology can be applied to any other industry where data from a cross-section of
markets are available and where rms encounter each other in many of these markets. More
generally, our methodology can be applied to any industry where there is some exogenous
shifter of the conjectural parameters, such as regulatory changes (Waldfogel and Wulf [2006]
and Parker and Roller [1997]) or lawsuits (Miller [2010]). The key step is to express the
conjectural parameters as functions of these exogenous shifters and nest these functions
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within a standard empirical oligopoly model.
One interesting extension of this paper would be a merger analysis that accounts for
the impact of multimarket contact. Our results suggest that mergers between large airlines
do not necessarily lead to higher prices. To see why, notice that an increase in multimarket
contact between legacy carriers results in almost no change in fares, while the same change in
multimarket contact between low-cost carriers and legacy carriers will result in large increases
in fares. Thus, recently completed (Delta and Northwest) and proposed (Continental and
United) mergers between legacy carriers should have little consequence for market power
while potentially introducing signicant cost e¢ ciencies.30
Our analysis is restrictive in a number of aspects, which constitute themes for future
research. First, we have assumed that the relevant level of multimarket contact is at the
national level, which follows EK and previous work. However, one might think that the level
of strategic interaction where multimarket contact plays a role is at the airport level. Second,
we have assumed that the functional form that relates conjectural parameters to multimarket
contact is the same for all carrier pairs. On one hand this simplies the analysis considerably
and still allows for heterogeneity in the conjectural parameters. On the other hand, there
might be fundamental di¤erences across di¤erent pairs. Third, our model is static, while one
might be interested in learning how the rms get to agree to tacitly collude.31 This would
require that we model the strategic interaction between rms as a dynamic game, which is
clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
30See Brueckner and Spiller [1994] for a discussion of economies of density.
31For a discussion of the importance of accounting for dynamics when estimating demand, see Hendel and
Nevo (2006).
27
References
[1] Ashenfelter, Orley, and Daniel Sullivan (1987) "Nonparametric Tests of Market Struc-
ture: An Application to the Cigarette Industry", Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4),
483-498.
[2] Baker, Jonathan, and Timothy Bresnahan (1988) "Estimating the Residual Demand
Curve Facing a Single Firm", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6(3),
283-300.
[3] Bernheim, Douglas B., and Michael D. Whinston (1990) "Multimarket Contact and
Collusive Behavior", Rand Journal of Economics, 21(1), 1-26.
[4] Berry, Steven (1990) "Airport Presence as Product Di¤erentiation", American Eco-
nomic Review P&P, 80(2), 394-399.
[5] Berry, Steven (1992) "Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry", Econo-
metrica, 60(4), 889-917.
[6] Berry, Steven (1994) "Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Di¤erentiation",
Rand Journal of Economics, 25(2), 242-262.
[7] Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes (1995) "Automobile Prices in Market
Equilibrium", Econometrica, 63(4), 841-890.
[8] Berry, Steven, Michael Carnall, and Pablo Spiller (2006) "Airline Hubs: Costs, Markups,
and the Implications of Costumer Heterogeneity", in Darin Lee (ed.), Advances in Air-
line Economics, Competition Policy and Antitrust, Vol. I, Elsevier.
[9] Berry, Steven, and Panle Jia (forthcoming). "Tracing the Woes: An Empirical Analysis
of the Airline Industry", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
[10] Berry, Steven. and Philip Haile (2010) "Identication in Di¤erentiated Products Markets
Using Market Level Data", Working Paper.
[11] Bilotkach, Volodymyr (2010) "Multimarket Competition and Intensity of Competition:
Evidence from an Airline Merger", Working Paper.
[12] Borenstein, Severin (1989) "Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the
U.S. Airline Industry", Rand Journal of Economics, 20(3), 344-365.
[13] Brander, James, and Anming Zhang (1990) "Market Conduct in the Airline Industry:
An Empirical Investigation", Rand Journal of Economics, 21(4), 567-583.
28
[14] Brander, James, and Anming Zhang (1993) "Dynamic Oligopoly Behaviour in the Air-
line Industry", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 11, 407-435.
[15] Bresnahan, Timothy (1981) "Departures from Marginal-Cost Pricing in the American
Automobile Industry", Journal of Econometrics, 17(2), 201-227.
[16] Bresnahan, Timothy (1982) "The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identied", Economic
Letters, 10(1-2), 87-92.
[17] Bresnahan, Timothy (1987) "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile
Oligopoly: The 1955 Price War", Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4), 457-482.
[18] Brueckner, Jan, Nichola Dyer, and Pablo Spiller (1992) "Fare Determination in Airline
Hub-and-Spoke Networks", Rand Journal of Economics, 23(3), 309-333.
[19] Brueckner, Jan, and Pablo Spiller (1994) "Economies of Tra¢ c Density in the Deregu-
lated Airline Industry", Journal of Law and Economics, 37(2), 379-415.
[20] Busse, Meghan (2000) "Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular
Telephone Industry", Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 9(3), 287-320.
[21] Ciliberto, Federico, and Elie Tamer (2009) "Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria
in the Airline Industry", Econometrica, 77(6), 1791-1828.
[22] Ciliberto, Federico, and Elie Tamer (2010) "Inference on Market Power in Markets with
Multiple Equilibria", Working Paper.
[23] Ciliberto, Federico and Jonathan Williams (forthcoming) "Limited Access to Airport
Facilities and Market Power in the Airline Industry", Journal of Law and Economics.
[24] Evans, William, and Ioannis Kessides (1994) "Living by the Golden Rule: Multimarket
Contact in the U.S. Airline Industry", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 341-366.
[25] Fernandez, Nerea, and Pedro Marin (1998) "Market Power and Multimarket Contact:
Some Evidence from the Spanish Hotel Industry", Journal of Industrial Economics,
46(3), 301-315.
[26] Fershtman, Chaim, and Ariel Pakes (2000) "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and
Price Wars", Rand Journal of Economics, 31(2), 207-236.
[27] Gasmi, Farid, La¤ont, Jean-Jacques La¤ont, and Quang Vuong (1992) "Econometric
Analysis of Collusive Behavior in a Soft-drink Market", Journal of Economics & Man-
agement Strategy, 1(2), 277-311.
29
[28] Goldberg, Pinelopi (1995) "Product Di¤erentiation and Oligopoly in International Mar-
kets: The Case of the U.S. Automobile Industry", Econometrica, 63(4), 891-951.
[29] Griliches, Zvi, and Jacques Mairesse (1995) "Production Functions: The Search for
Identication", Working Paper.
[30] Harrington, Joseph (2008) "Detecting Cartels", in Paolo Buccirossi (ed.), Handbook in
Antitrust Economics, MIT Press.
[31] Hendel, Igal, and Aviv Nevo (2006) "Measuring the Implications of Sales and Consumer
Inventory Behavior", Econometrica, 74(6), 1637-1673.
[32] Hendricks, Kenneth, and Robert Porter (1989) "Collusion in Auctions", Annales
dEconomie et de Statistique, 15/16, 217-230.
[33] Jacquemin, Alexis, and Margaret Slade (1989) "Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal
Merger", in Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Or-
ganization, Vol. II, Elsevier.
[34] Jans, Ivette, and David Rosenbaum (1997) "Multimarket Contact and Pricing: Evi-
dence from the U.S. Cement Industry", International Journal of Industrial Organiza-
tion, 15(3), 391-412.
[35] Lau, Lawrence (1982) "On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry
Price and Output Data", Economic Letters, 10(1-2), 93-99.
[36] Lederman, Mara (2007) "Do Enhancements to Loyalty Programs A¤ect Demand? The
Impact of International Frequent Flyer Partnerships on Domestic Airline Demand",
Rand Journal of Economics, 38(4), 1134-1158.
[37] Lederman, Mara (2008) "Are Frequent Flyer Programs a Cause of the Hub Premium?",
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 17(1), 35-66.
[38] Manski, Charles (1993) "Identication of Endogenous Social E¤ects: The Reection
Problem", Review of Economic Studies, 60(3), 531-542.
[39] Miller, Amalia (forthcoming) "Did the Airline Tari¤ Publishing Case Reduce Collu-
sion?" Journal of Law and Economics.
[40] Nevo, Aviv (1998) "Identication of the Oligopoly Solution Concept in a Di¤erentiated-
Product Industry", Economics Letters, 59(3), 391-395.
[41] Nevo, Aviv (2001) "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry",
Econometrica, 69(2), 307-342.
30
[42] Panzar, John, and James Rosse (1987) "Testing for MonopolyEquilibrium", Journal
of Industrial Economics, 35(4), 443-456.
[43] Parker, Philip, and Lars-Hendrik Roller (1997) "Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multi-
market Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry", Rand Journal
of Economics, 28(2), 304-322.
[44] Peters, Craig (2006) "Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from
the U.S. Airline Industry", Journal of Law and Economics, 49(2), 627-649.
[45] Porter, Robert (1983) "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee,
1880-1886", Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2), 301-314.
[46] Porter, Robert (2005) "Detecting Collusion", Review of Industrial Organization, 26(2),
147-167.
[47] Porter, Robert, and J. Douglas Zona (2008) "Collusion", in W.D. Collins (ed.), Issues
in Competition Law and Policy, American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law.
[48] Reiss, Peter, and Pablo Spiller (1989) "Competition and Entry in Small Airline Mar-
kets", Journal of Law and Economics, 32(2), 179-202.
[49] Rosse, James (1970) "Estimating Cost Function Parameters without Using Cost Data:
Illustrated Methodology", Econometrica, 38(2), 256-275.
[50] Salvo, Alberto (2010) "Inferring Market Power under the Threat of Entry: The Case of
the Brazilian Cement Industry", Rand Journal of Economics, 41(2), 326-350.
[51] Singal, Vijay (1996) "Airline Mergers and Multimarket Contact", Managerial and De-
cision Economics, 17(6), 559-574.
[52] Verboven, Frank (1996) "International Price Discrimination in the European Car Mar-
ket", Rand Journal of Economics, 27(2), 240-268.
[53] Waldfogel, Joel, and Julie Wulf (2006) "Measuring the E¤ect of Multimarket Contact
on Competition: Evidence from Mergers Following Radio Broadcast Ownership Dereg-
ulation", Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, 5(1).
[54] Weyl, Glen (2009) "Slutsky Meets Marschak: The First-Order Identication of Multi-
product Production", Working Paper.
[55] White, Lawrence (2001) "Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?", Review
of Industrial Organization, 18(1), 23-31.
31
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
Ti
ck
et
 F
ar
e 
(D
ol
la
rs
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Average Multimarket Contact
Observed Prices (Median Spline)
Fitted Values, with Monopolies
Fitted Values, without Monopolies
Figure 1: Multimarket Contact, Prices, and Monopoly
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Multimarket Contact (1000s of Markets)
f(m
m
c)
Figure 2: Collusion and Multimarket Contact
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Avg. Multimarket Contact (1000s of Markets)
%
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 A
vg
. P
ric
e
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Avg. Multimarket Contact (1000s of Markets)
%
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 A
vg
. P
ric
e
Figure 3: Multimarket Contact and Prices 

A
A
A
S
B6
CO
D
L
F9
FL
G
4
N
K
N
W
SY
TZ
U
5
U
A
U
S
W
N
YX
A
A
•
22
84
683
855
116
273
7
11
686
11
29
5
819
579
339
119
A
S
22
•
3
13
35
10
3
0
0
18
0
1
0
50
30
9
2
B6
84
3
•
96
132
2
57
0
7
83
0
0
4
124
125
41
2
CO
683
13
96
•
733
88
244
4
12
555
5
24
7
572
559
314
86
D
L
855
35
132
733
•
115
455
5
20
907
7
28
10
1008
1150
385
114
F9
116
10
2
88
115
•
41
0
3
87
5
8
0
140
115
72
18
FL
273
3
57
244
455
41
•
0
13
306
4
17
5
290
388
106
54
G
4
7
0
0
4
5
0
0
•
0
5
3
0
0
11
5
0
1
N
K
11
0
7
12
20
3
13
0
•
13
0
1
1
14
20
6
1
N
W
686
18
83
555
907
87
306
5
13
•
14
27
7
871
612
282
169
SY
11
0
0
5
7
5
4
3
0
14
•
0
0
13
7
0
3
TZ
29
1
0
24
28
8
17
0
1
27
0
•
0
29
24
28
13
U
5
5
0
4
7
10
0
5
0
1
7
0
0
•
5
10
6
0
U
A
819
50
124
572
1008
140
290
11
14
871
13
29
5
•
847
329
159
U
S
579
30
125
559
1150
115
388
5
20
612
7
24
10
847
•
327
74
W
N
339
9
41
314
385
72
106
0
6
282
0
28
6
329
327
•
39
YX
119
2
2
86
114
18
54
1
1
169
3
13
0
159
74
39
•
Table 1:  N
um
ber of Com
m
on M
arkets in 2007‐Q
1
Variable  Source Description Observations Mean Median  Std. Dev.
Fare DB1B Carrier‐Market‐Specific Average Fare 268119 222.692 213.472 66.502
Nonstop DB1B Indicator of Nonstop Service 268119 0.173 0.000 0.379
NetworkSize DB1B
Percentage of All Routes Served by Carrier at 
Originating Airport 295674 0.443 0.470 0.174
ExtraMiles DB1B
Average Distance Flown Between Market Endpoints 
(equals Distance for Nonstop Service)
268119 1258.628 1121.000 625.219
Average_MMC DB1B
Average Market Contact from mmc Matrix (divided 
by 1,000)
268119 0.630 0.621 0.265
MktShare DB1B Market‐Carrier Share of Passengers 268119 0.274 0.168 0.286
HHI DB1B Market‐Carrier Share of Passengers 268119 0.453 0.404 0.214
Roundtrip DB1B Proportion of Roundtrip Passengers 268119 0.827 0.853 0.130
Hub Author  Indicator for Hub Endpoint 268119 0.104 0.000 0.306
Distance DB1B Nonstop Distance Between Market Endpoints 268119 1105.694 969.000 596.201
MktSize BEA Geometric Mean of Population at Market Endpoints 268119 2409758 1789943 1993143
Common_avg Survey Common Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.270 0.226 0.178
AA_avg Survey AA Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.097 0.072 0.084
CO_avg Survey CO Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.067 0.050 0.075
DL_avg Survey DL Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.103 0.084 0.082
NW_avg Survey NW Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.085 0.051 0.107
UA_avg Survey UA Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.087 0.058 0.081
US_avg Survey US Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.126 0.099 0.112
WN_avg Survey WN Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.075 0.056 0.075
AS_avg Survey AS Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.006 0.000 0.018
B6_avg Survey B6 Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.014 0.000 0.018
F9_avg Survey F9 Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.012 0.000 0.026
FL_avg Survey FL Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.023 0.015 0.027
TZ_avg Survey TZ Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.000 0.000 0.001
G4_avg Survey G4 Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.006 0.000 0.019
YX_avg Survey YX Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.014 0.000 0.042
NK_avg Survey NK Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.002 0.000 0.006
U5_avg Survey U5 Mean % Gates at Market Endpoints 268119 0.001 0.000 0.003
Table 2:  Variable Description and Summary Statistics
Carrier‐Market‐Specific Variables
Market‐Specific Variables
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average_MMC 0.246*** 0.291*** ‐0.017*** 0.054*** 0.520*** 0.667***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.016)
Hub 0.208*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.177*** 0.194***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
NetworkSize 0.630*** 0.314*** 0.224*** 0.226*** 0.496*** 0.207***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Nonstop ‐0.054*** ‐0.065*** ‐0.032*** ‐0.032*** ‐0.054*** ‐0.033***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RoundTrip ‐0.548*** ‐0.576*** ‐0.533*** ‐0.539*** ‐0.443*** ‐0.548***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 0.004) (0.004)
HHI 0.014
(0.011)
MktShare 0.063***
(0.005)
Log(Distance) ‐1.240*** ‐0.438***
(0.024) (0.058)
Log2(Distance) 0.105*** 0.049***
0.002 (0.004)
Market Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
IV No No No No Yes Yes
Excluding Monopolies No No No Yes No Yes
R2 0.167 0.223 0.143 0.171 0.241 0.350
Observations 85,920 85,920 268,119 252,284 268,119 252,284
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: Year‐Quarter Dummies, Carrier Dummies included in all regressions. Their coefficient estimates, 
           as well as the constant estimate, are omitted for sake of brevity.
Table 3: Prices and Multimarket Contact
 Top 1000 Markets  All Markets
Demand estimate std. error estimate std. error estimate std. error
Price1 ‐1.32*** 0.017 ‐1.674*** 0.016 ‐1.189*** 0.022
Price2 ‐0.126*** 0.003 ‐0.223*** 0.003 ‐0.117*** 0.004
κ1 (fraction type 1 consumers) 0.675*** 0.337 0.401*** 0.204 0.687** 0.417
Constant1 ‐5.692*** 0.526 ‐4.861*** 0.328 ‐5.954*** 0.679
Constant2 ‐7.626*** 1.019 ‐7.59*** 0.618 ‐7.596*** 1.155
Nonstop1 1.194*** 0.007 1.119*** 0.008 1.144*** 0.008
Nonstop2 0.931*** 0.009 1.074*** 0.009 1.034*** 0.009
λ  (nesting parameter) 0.571*** 0.002 0.540*** 0.002 0.564*** 0.003
Network Size 0.600*** 0.018 0.419*** 0.018 0.542*** 0.018
Distance 1.93*** 0.032 1.814*** 0.032 1.848*** 0.032
Distance2 ‐0.482*** 0.029 ‐0.481*** 0.011 ‐0.476*** 0.011
Extra‐miles ‐0.867*** 0.029 ‐0.696*** 0.029 ‐0.775*** 0.029
Extra‐miles2 0.131*** 0.009 0.107*** 0.009 0.115*** 0.009
Supply
Constant 0.869*** 0.005 0.502*** 0.005 0.549*** 0.003
Distance 0.257*** 0.013 0.171*** 0.013 0.383*** 0.008
Distance2 ‐0.01*** 0.005 ‐0.047*** 0.005 ‐0.072*** 0.003
Extra‐miles 0.073*** 0.013 ‐0.063*** 0.013 ‐0.063*** 0.008
Extra‐miles2 ‐0.039*** 0.004 0.009*** 0.005 0.006*** 0.003
Contact
Constant ‐3.145*** 0.295
MMC 6.006*** 2.989
Model Fit
Median Marginal Cost 1.111 0.537 0.778
Median Elasticity ‐3.042 ‐2.746 ‐2.813
Median Elasticity ‐ Type1 ‐4.306 ‐5.701 ‐3.922
Medoam Elasticity ‐ Type2 ‐0.415 ‐0.763 ‐0.389
Function Value 28785.805 27402.381 27176.777
Table 4:  BCS Estimation
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Note: Year‐Quarter Dummies, Carrier Dummies included in all regressions. Their coefficient estimates, 
           as well as the constant estimate, are omitted for sake of brevity.
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Table 5:  Price Coordination in 2007‐Q
1
